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JAN 5 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence

SUBJECT: FI Statement for Possible Inclusion in  
New NSC 50 Progress Report

In accordance with your request there is attached  
an "FI Statement for Possible Inclusion in New NSC 50  
Progress Report."

/S/ Richard Helms  
For

FRANK G. WISNER  
Deputy Director, Plans

Attachment

5 January 1953

Distribution:

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**FI Statement for Possible Inclusion in New ISC 50  
Progress Report**

1. As the Council is well aware, the covert intelligence collection activity against the Soviet and Satellite orbit is fraught with difficulties. Ample funds are available for this activity, which consumes only a small proportion of the appropriation for the overall covert operations. In spite of the absence of financial concern, intensified efforts to produce strategic intelligence have produced only a modicum of success in relation to our national requirements, which are being lavied ever more heavily upon the covert collection mechanism as the overt avenues of approach are closed. The lack of significant progress is chargeable to a number of very real obstacles, which become glaringly apparent on close examination.

2. The first and most obvious difficulties stem from the brutal efficiency of the Soviet security organizations. This efficiency is gradually and inexorably being superimposed on its Satellites. Tightening controls around and within the whole Soviet orbit have considerably reduced the opportunities for penetration, and seriously threaten existing successful operations. This factor is further complicated by a paucity of indigenous agent personnel of sufficiently strong motivation to undertake the physical dangers involved. To counter these additional roadblocks, the major weight of effort for covert collection is being redirected towards alternative means of approach to strategic targets. A further difficulty is caused by the necessity for assigning certain of our most senior and competent intelligence officers to the support of other types of covert operations.

3. On the credit side, we are continuing to produce a considerable quantity of meaningful and usable intelligence. However, really brilliant accomplishments remain comparatively rare. Advancements have been made in the creation of support facilities which are prerequisite to collection activity. T

Through the Special Service Program we are attempting to attract and retain urgently needed competent personnel to participate in our work.

4. In conclusion, I can only say that there have been some steps taken toward our ultimate goal of obtaining accurate and timely strategic intelligence on the Soviet and its allies. On the other hand, our difficulties have increased rather than decreased. Furthermore, I am frank in stating that I cannot envisage a significant betterment of this situation in the foreseeable future.

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